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AWARD FEES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO CONTRACT 
SUCCESS 
ABSTRACT 
Award fee contracts are applicable when objective criteria are neither feasible nor 
effective. They were heavily used to incentivize contractor performance in the 
procurement of major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) until 2005, when the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) released Report 06-66. The report caused 
the Department of Defense to shy away from using award fee contracts, resulting in a 
usage decrease by 46% in 2007 and 85% in 2008. The purpose of this research is to 
determine whether a relationship exists between award fee contracts and contract 
success as measured by earned value management (EVM) or contractor performance 
ratings. Data was collected from a sample of contracts from a major Navy 
command. Six contract observations were identified as successful contracts, with 
one contract being labeled a failure. Further analysis showed a positive correlation 
between award fee decisions and contractor performance ratings on the successful 
contracts. Although the findings are encouraging, they were not statistically 
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In fiscal year (FY) 2013, over 50% of the $613.9 billion Department of Defense 
(DOD) budget was obligated on contracts and purchase orders (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2014). This reveals the essential role defense contracting 
plays in the United States’ ability to prepare military forces and project power across the 
globe. To successfully manage contracts, contracting officers require a range of tools to 
produce outcomes beneficial to the government. Over the years, acquisition regulations 
have evolved to provide contracting professionals means to incentivize contractor 
performance. The two primary methods are award fees and incentive fees. According to 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), incentives are designed to “motivate 
contractor efforts that might not otherwise be emphasized in the contract and discourage 
contractor inefficiency and waste” (16.401(a)(2)(ii), 2014). 
Government and industry have competing contracting goals, making incentive 
structure in contracts a challenging endeavor. Industry’s primary responsibility is to 
maximize the value of shareholders’ wealth (Roe, 2001). Government contracting goals 
are to procure a quality product, at a fair and reasonable price, while meeting public 
policy requirements. Contract incentives need to be configured in a manner that promotes 
cooperative behaviors between the two parties (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2013). For 
instance, if an incentive is designed to keep a program on schedule, incentives should 
reward early delivery and penalize schedule overruns.  
Brown et al. (2013) identified two broad categories of products: simple and 
complex. Simple products are well-defined items, readily available on the commercial 
market. A simple product can be procured using a complete contract structure since both 
parties (buyer and seller) have a clear understanding of the product, terms, and conditions 
(Brown et al., 2013). Complex products are characterized by uncertainty. The product 
characteristics, capabilities, and cost are unknown, creating a “zone of contractual 
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ambiguity” between parties (Brown et al., 2013, p. 40). Properly structured incentives can 
influence cooperative behavior of the two parties to seek a mutually beneficial outcome.    
Contract incentive fees are utilized where objective targets are developed to 
reward contractor cost, schedule, or technical performance goals. The amount of 
incentive fee a contractor earns is well defined, clearly identifying the value received by 
the government. Contract award fees are similarly applied; however, contractor 
performance is based on subjective targets, making their effectiveness as a motivating 
force more ambiguous. This research contends that it is possible to quantify award fee 
outcomes by using associated measures of contract success, such as earned value 
management (EVM) or contractor performance ratings. 
Award fee contracts are synonymous with expensive, major defense acquisition 
programs (MDAPs), increasing their exposure to inquiry and analysis (GAO, 2005). They 
are intended to improve government-contractor relationships, enhance cooperative 
behavior, and drive towards a win-win exchange (Brown et al., 2013). The amount of 
award fee a contractor earns is determined by award fee criteria established in the award 
fee plan. The criterion is subjective, resulting in award fee payment scrutiny by 
government oversight organizations, causing award fees to fall in and out of favor despite 
their usefulness. In 1992, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified award 
fees as a contributing factor to contract management being a high-risk category within the 
DOD (GAO, 2015). The GAO (2005) argues that the way the DOD implements award 
fee contracts are ineffective because they do not hold contractors accountable, fall short 
of motivating contractor performance, and are not linked to desired outcomes. In 
response to these reports, the DOD enacted policy measures to improve implementation 
of award fees. This research analyzes contracts awarded after the DOD policy changes to 
see if a relationship exists between award fees earned by contractors and contract success. 
The next section discusses the purpose of this research. 
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to determine if a relationship exists between award 
fee contracts and contract success as measured by earned value management (EVM) or 
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contractor performance ratings. Prior government assessments, such as GAO Report 06-
66, titled Defense Acquisitions: Department of Defense (DOD) Has Paid Billions in 
Award and Incentive Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes (GAO, 2005), left a 
negative perception of award fee usefulness. This research suggests award fees are a vital 
tool for program offices and contracting officers and can be linked to contract success. 
Award fee contracts are a means for the contractor and government to mitigate risk in 
administering a program (Rendon & Snider, 2008). A sample of award fee contracts is 
analyzed to establish a framework to relate award fees to contract success. Where 
successful contract relationships are identified, further trend analysis is conducted to find 
correlation with other contract elements, such as contract dollar value, procurement type, 
source selection criteria, and acquisition life-cycle phase of the program. 
GAO (2005) based the findings in Report 06-66 on the overall system cost, 
schedule, and technical performance outcomes that can be influenced by a multitude of 
factors. It can be argued that approach lacked in-depth analysis of the award fee plans and 
award fee criteria used to make award fee decisions. A review of these elements could 
provide greater insight into the existence of a relationship between award fee decisions 
and contract success. Identifying the relationship award fee decisions have with contract 
success can determine whether award fees are effective contracting tools. The next 
section introduces the research questions used to guide this study.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions guided data collection and analysis of this study. 
The research questions are listed along with a brief explanation of why that question was 
selected and what results it was expected to yield.  
1. How are Award Fee Decisions and EVM Related? 
This question analyzes the relationship between earned value management (EVM) 
as a management metric and award fee decisions. EVM is used as an early warning 
indicator of program cost, technical performance, and schedule issues. The use of EVM is 
required for the procurement of major systems or capital assets, to manage risk during the 
acquisition process (FAR 34.005-2(b)(6)). EVM metrics are submitted at a minimum on a 
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monthly basis and provide a snapshot of contractor performance to support award fee 
decisions. EVM provides an objective measure of cost and schedule to compare with 
subjective award fee decision criteria. By analyzing this relationship it can be shown 
whether award fee decisions were synchronized with program cost, technical 
performance, or schedule outcomes. 
2. How are award fee decisions and contractor performance related?  
This question examines the relationship between award fee decisions and 
contractor performance ratings. During each contract performance period, the 
government is required to conduct an evaluation of how that contractor performed. These 
assessments establish the contractor’s performance rating and are heavily factored into 
whether a contractor receives future contract awards. The timing of performance rating 
submissions and award fee decisions do not exactly match, but will have significant 
periods of performance overlap. A prior study was conducted to measure contractor 
performance ratings with successful contracts. The model developed by that study is 
utilized to quantify the relationship between award fee decisions and contractor 
performance ratings in this study. The model is further discussed in Chapter 3, under the 
Contractor Performance Rating section.  
3. How are Successful Contracts, as Identified by EVM and Contractor 
Performance Ratings, Related to Other Contract Elements? 
The first two questions identify successful contracts based on EVM and 
contractor performance rating. For those contracts that were characterized as 
“successful,” this research question analyzes contract structure to determine whether any 
trends exist. For instance, if a contract element appears multiple times in successful 
award fee contracts, it is an indicator of future contract success under similar 
circumstances.   
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this research is to analyze cost-plus award fee (CPAF) and fixed 
price award fee (FPAF) contracts. Government contracting utilizes other incentive type 
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contracts, but those are objective in nature, with a clear definition of use and success. 
CPAF and FPAF contracts utilize subjective grading criteria, making the relationship 
between award fee decisions and contract success more difficult to measure. Construction 
contracts have specific procedures that are not pertinent to this study and are therefore 
omitted. This research focuses solely on service and material contracts with at least one 
award fee contract line item number (CLIN).    
The study is limited by the size of the sample. Only contracts from one Navy 
command were reviewed. The Navy command had a total sample of 31 contracts that 
used award fee CLINs between 2008 and 2014. Of those 31 contracts, 13 contracts were 
selected for data analysis. Award fee decisions were only available for seven of the 13 
selected contracts. The smaller contract sample size increases the margin of error with 
regard to the data representing the award fee contract population as a whole.  
Another limitation is that the study examined contracts from one of four possible 
DOD services (the Navy). The Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps are other DOD 
organizations that use award fee contracts. Each service has unique procurement 
requirements; thus, not analyzing all of the services may not accurately characterize the 
relationship between award fee decisions and contract success across the entire DOD. 
Moreover, only data from one Navy command was gathered. There are multiple Navy 
contracting commands, meaning the relationship between award fee decisions and 
contract success within the Navy could vary.  
Award fees could be used in conjunction with another incentive tool which 
creates a study limitation. Contracts could use both award and incentive fees, making it 
difficult to isolate the degree to which the award fee or the other incentive is making the 
contribution to contract success. This study acknowledges the existence of such 
possibilities, but does not have the means to segregate the influencing factors.  
The availability of data was discovered to be a limitation during the data 
gathering phase. Earned value management data was not available at the sub-component 
level for major systems; it was only available for the overarching program. Contractor 
performance ratings and award fee decision time periods could not be precisely aligned. 
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For instance, there were close-out contractor performance ratings that encompassed the 
entire contract performance periods, but all the award fee decisions for the same period 
were not available. In those instances, the award fee decisions were averaged to represent 
an overall award fee decision for the entire period. 
The last study limitation is due to causal factors external to the contractor. In 
some cases the government can be responsible for schedule, performance, or cost changes 
in a program. Those changes could affect the contractor performance rating and impact 
program cost and schedule outcomes. It is undeterminable how to account for these 
influencing factors in the study. The next section provides the organization of the paper. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER 
This paper is organized in five chapters: Introduction, Literature Review, 
Methodology, Data Presentation, and Summary and Conclusion. The first chapter covers 
the introduction to the topic, lists the research questions to be analyzed, and provides the 
scope, limitations, and assumptions. The second chapter is a literature review of the topic. 
It describes the history of government award fee contracts, summarizes previous research 
on the topic to establish a foundation, and discusses current award fee policies. The 
methodology section in Chapter III provides a research road map. It details how data was 
gathered and recorded for analysis. The fourth chapter discusses research findings and 
provides interpretation of the results. The results provide implications for future use of 
award fee contracts. Chapter IV also provides answers to the research questions. Chapter 
V is the summary and conclusion, where the entire research paper is synopsized. This 
chapter also provides areas for further research. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented an introduction to the research. The first section provided a 
brief background on award fees to establish a foundational knowledge on the subject. The 
next section introduced the purpose of the research that guided research question 
selection and data collection. The three research questions were then listed; each research 
question included an explanation of what that question was designed to uncover. Next, 
the research scope and limitations were provided. This section explained the parameters 
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in which the research was conducted. The last section showed how the research paper is 
organized. The next chapter provides a literature review of award fee contracts in 
government acquisition.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
With DOD spending over $200 billion annually to acquire products and 
services that include everything from spare parts to the development of 
major weapon systems, our numerous, large, and mounting fiscal 
challenges demand that DOD maximize its return on investment and 
provide the warfighter with needed capabilities at the best value for the 
taxpayer. In an effort to encourage defense contractors to perform in an 
innovative, efficient, and effective way, DOD gives its contractors the 
opportunity to collectively earn billions of dollars through monetary 
incentives known as award and incentive fees. Using these incentives 
properly, in concert with sound acquisition practices, is a key to 
minimizing waste, maximizing value, and getting our military personnel 
what they need, when and where they need it. Unfortunately, DOD has not 
used these incentives effectively.  
—Testimony of the Comptroller General of the United States 
to the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, 
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate (GAO, 2006, p. 1) 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter offers an overview of award fee contracts utilized in government 
procurement. Award fee contracts have been a preferred contract vehicle for motivating 
contractor performance, subject to scrutiny regarding effectiveness, and regulated by 
recent audit reports. Recent audits from the GAO questioned the effectiveness of the 
DOD’s use of award fees. The DOD responded to the GAO audits by implementing 
policy changes, developing a community of practice to share lessons learned, and 
revising training of its acquisition workforce. This chapter discusses the theory behind 
award fee contracts, describes the government contracting process, summarizes the 
current policy that governs award fees, highlights the history of award fees, summarizes 
recent issues identified in GAO reports, and reviews the DOD’s response to GAO audits.   
B. PURPOSE AND GOALS OF AWARD FEES  
The government and private sector use bonuses to incentivize performance 
objectives in business to business contracting arrangements. These bonuses are structured 
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to motivate performance such as early delivery, higher quality, or lower costs. One salient 
example of a state government using bonuses in a fashion similar to an award fee is in the 
contract for interchange repair work done on the I-580 interstate in Oakland, California. 
Patrick May reported in the San Jose Mercury News (2007) reported that a section of the 
interchange collapsed after a fuel tanker caught on fire and melted the steel structure 
under the interchange. The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) awarded a 
contract to C.C. Meyers to repair the collapsed section. Erik Nelson of the San Jose 
Mercury News (2007) summarized the contract by reporting “Caltrans awarded a contract 
for $867,075 to a Rancho Cordova company—along with the promise of up to $5 million 
in incentives for finishing early.” This incentive of a $200,000-a-day bonus was 
structured to motivate CC Meyers to complete work ahead of schedule. May reported that 
the interchange was opened 32 days ahead of schedule and resulted in CC Meyers 
earning the full $5 million bonus (May, 2007). Private industry uses similar incentive 
structures. 
The private industry uses various forms of incentives structures in contracts to 
motivate contractors towards desired objective outcomes. Bower, Ashby, Gerald, and 
Smyk (2002) conducted a study on the use of incentive mechanisms in project success. 
They identified that firms use incentives to align firms’ objectives and the contractors’ 
objectives, for risk allocation, and create appropriate contractor involvement (Bower, 
Ashby, Gerald, and Smyk, 2002). Their study used three construction related contracts: 
(1) offshore design, procurement, and construction; (2) systems, applications, and 
products (SAP) implementation; and (3) plant maintenance support services. Bower, et al. 
(2007) identified that the contracts were structured to meet “project cost, schedule, and 
quality objectives” (p. 7). Further, their study concluded that the contract structures and 
incentives used in the subject contracts resulted in performance that exceeded the firms’ 
objectives (Bower et al., 2007). The incentive structures used in the subject contracts 
included award fee type of bonuses to motivate the contractor to align their objectives 
with the firms, resulting in exceptional performance.  
This theme of alignment is not new. Raymond Hunt (1985) identified a need for a 
flexible incentive mechanism that would align governmental and contractor objectives in 
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procurements involving complex contracts with great uncertainty in terms of 
requirements definition. Hunt introduced a joint model (J-model) methodology that 
involved the use of award fee contracts to achieve this alignment (Hunt, 1985). He 
identified the award fee contract as “a continuing framework for negotiating and planning 
the evolving design, development, and management of dynamic program organizations 
and operations wherein the contract (as a plan for performance) is not categorically 
divorced from its downstream modes of administration” (Hunt, 1985, p. 589). This 
framework provides that award fee contracts can be structured to align governmental and 
contractor objectives through cooperation by providing incentives, establishing periods of 
communication during evaluation, and allowing flexibility in redefining objective 
priorities throughout the term of the contract. This framework, Hunt’s J-model to 
program management, allows the flexibility for managers to motivate contractors towards 
exceptional performance.  
The introductory quote, at the beginning of this chapter, from the comptroller 
general highlights the main premise behind awards and incentives: to provide an 
incentive to a contractor to achieve specific acquisition objectives by performing in an 
innovative, effective, and efficient manner. The government contracting environment 
reflects the buyer-supplier relationship that is often informed in the economic literature 
by agency theory (Rendon, 2011). In government contracting, the government is the 
principal, and the contractor is an agent (Rendon, 2011). Both the government and 
contractor are parties in an exchange that is governed by the principal-agent problem or 
agency theory (Rendon, 2011). The next few paragraphs addresses the objectives and 
behaviors of the parties, examines the conflicting objectives of the parties, discusses the 
relation of mutual understanding by product or service and contract type, explores 
possible behavior combinations each party may take, uses game theory’s prisoner’s 
dilemma to examine the behavior outcomes, and discusses contract rules and relationship 
mechanisms that can motivate win–win outcomes. 
Contractors in government procurement typically represent private or public 
firms. Some possible objectives of these firms include earning a profit, capturing market 
share, growing the business, or maintaining cash flow (Rendon, 2011). These objectives 
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are met in government procurement contracts by receiving monetary compensation for 
their efforts in delivering a product or service. In contrast, the principal is the 
government. The government’s objectives might include meeting public policy goals 
such as supporting small businesses, obtaining goods or services at a fair and reasonable 
price, and maintaining a viable industrial base; procuring the customers requirement in a 
timely manner; and ensuring the product or service meets the customer’s quality and 
technical specification standards (Rendon, 2011). The principal and agent’s objectives are 
often at odds, motivating each party to withhold or share information in accordance with 
their individual interests (Rendon, 2011). Further, Rendon (2011) identifies that: 
Agency theory is concerned with the conflicting goals between principal 
and agent in obtaining their respective objectives and is focused on 
mechanisms related to obtaining information (for example about the 
marketplace, the supply or service, or the contractor), selecting the agent 
(to counter the problem of adverse selection), and monitoring the agent’s 
performance (to counter the effects of moral hazard). (p. 7) 
The amount of information either side has depends on the type of product or 
service being procured. 
The types of products the government procures can be defined in two main groups 
being either simple or complex. Brown et al. (2013) define simple products as ones in 
which “their important attributes can easily and clearly be spelled out in advance and can 
be unambiguously verified once the product or service has been delivered (p. 12). Classic 
examples of simple products include consumable supplies and commercially available 
products that are sold in wide markets. In contrast, Brown et al. (2013) define complex 
products as ones that “have important qualities that cannot be easily and clearly spelled 
out in advance and are difficult to verify after the product has been delivered” (p. 12). 
The difficulty in verifying delivery and uncertainty in defining requirements allows for 
the greater potential in information asymmetry between the principal and the agent 
(Brown et al., 2013).  
Brown et al. (2013) provided a good example of the primary type of product and 
contract type that suit the use of award fees. They stated that complex products which 
involve complex exchanges with complex contracts are more likely to result in 
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information asymmetry requiring some form of incentive to motivate either party’s 
behavior to cooperate (Brown et al., 2013). A complex product is not well-defined in 
terms of specifications and performance (Brown et al., 2013). These complex products 
require complex exchanges due to a high level of uncertainty regarding the product’s 
performance, delivery, and cost attributes that often leads to specialized investment by 
each party (Brown, 2013). The complex products and exchanges lead to complex 
contracts that are incomplete due to the low level of specificity and increased flexibility 
regulating each party’s behavior (Brown, 2013). The contracts are incomplete in regards 
to the terms and conditions that regulate the contract. The uncertainty, specialized 
investment, and low level of specificity allow each party more flexibility and discretion 
to behave in pursuit of self-interest (Brown, 2013). This flexibility and discretion to act in 
self-interest can lead to behavior that results in other than win–win outcomes.   
There are many combinations of behavior that can result in other than win–win 
outcomes. Consummate, or cooperative, behavior results when both parties choose to 
behave in a manner that is not individually optimal, but is optimal for the combined 
relationship (Brown, 2013). Alternately, perfunctory, or uncooperative, behavior occurs 
when each or one party pursues its own interests even at the greater expense to the other 
(Brown, 2013). The prisoner’s dilemma provides a sound explanation and depiction of 
the possible behavior combinations and their associated outcomes. 
The prisoner’s dilemma is a principle of game theory that depicts a set of 
exchanges between two parties (Brown, 2013). The buyer (government) and seller 
(contractor), engage in a set of exchanges that have the option to cooperate or to defect. 
The amount of payoff each receives is determined by how the other party behaves. If the 
buyer and seller both defect, they receive the lowest payoff. If one party defects while the 
other party cooperates, the defecting party benefits at the cooperating party’s expense. 
The highest combined payoff occurs when both parties cooperate. Table 1 depicts the 




Table 1.   The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
          BUYER 
 SELLER 
COOPERATE DEFECT 















 Note. Relationships are depicted as buyer-seller; i.e., win-lose means buyer wins, seller loses. 
In the prisoner’s dilemma, there is an incentive for individual parties to defect 
because they stand to potentially realize a larger win if the other party cooperates. If they 
both do not cooperate, they both lose and realize a smaller pie. If they both cooperate, 
they both win and there is a larger pie. The challenge in complex contracting is to 
structure contracts and contract relationships in a manner that incentivizes each party to 
choose cooperative behavior instead of seeking self-interest (Brown, 2013).  
One of the solutions to fix the prisoner’s dilemma in complex contracting is to use 
performance incentives to “narrow the range of discretionary behavior, thereby 
mitigating but not eliminating complex contracting’s lose-lose potential” (Brown, 2013, 
p. 144). In order for performance incentives to be effective, Brown (2013) stated that they 
“need clearly defined standards, objectively measured and commonly understood by the 
buyer and seller, and adequately backed by properly scaled sanctions and rewards” (p. 
143). Award fees are a form of incentive contracting aimed at motivating contractor 
performance towards a specific acquisition objective. To be in line with Brown’s (2013) 
assessment of effective performance incentives, award fees must have clearly defined 
award fee criteria that is linked to specific acquisition outcomes, must have clearly 
defined methods for performance evaluation that is objective, and must have award fee 
pool amounts that are commensurate with incentivizing contractor performance towards 
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desired outcomes. Award fee contracting is discussed in more detail in Section D of this 
chapter. The next section addresses the key functions of the phases of the government 
contracting process and how they relate to award fees. 
C. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
The government contract management process consists of six phases: 
procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract 
administration, and contract closeout or termination (Rendon & Snider, 2008). A 
comprehensive review of all the facets of each phase is beyond the scope of this project. 
Chapter 10 in Rendon and Snider’s (2008) Management of Defense Acquisition Projects 
and Chapter 3 in Garrett’s (2010) World Class Contracting provide a comprehensive 
review of each phase. This section addresses key functions of each phase as they relate to 
award fee contracting.   
1. Procurement Planning 
Procurement planning is the process of reviewing the customer’s requirement to 
determine a make-or-buy decision, identifying a contract type, and developing a 
description of the product. For government contracting, the make-or-buy decision 
typically involves deciding between buying a commercial product, outsourcing the 
development of a product, or leveraging in-house capabilities to develop a product. The 
make-or-buy decision influences the selection of a contract type based on the level of 
performance risk. Commercial items are procured with firm-fixed-price type contracts 
due to their low risk of performance. Developmental products that involve uncertain or 
broadly defined performance requirements are better suited to cost-reimbursement 
contracts. This process is informed by information and analysis gathered during market 
research. Market research helps define what capabilities and products currently exist in 
the marketplace to meet the customer’s requirement and can help define the requirement. 
Additionally, the results of the market research and definition of the customer’s 
requirement inform the source selection strategy. If the requirements are definitively 
known and the product or service is readily available in the market with little variation 
amongst competitors, a lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) source selection 
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process is suitable (Rendon & Snider, 2008). In contrast, contracting policy allows for a 
tradeoff process for products or services if it is determined that best value can be obtained 
through an “award to other than lowest priced offeror or other than the highest technically 
rated offeror” (FAR 15.101). The procurement planning phase concludes with the 
development of a requirements document that defines the product characteristics and a 
procurement management plan. For award fee contracts, the development of a 
requirements document aids in determining the viability of award fee criteria to motivate 
the contractor towards an acquisition objective.   
2. Solicitation Planning 
The solicitation planning phase consists of documenting the procurement method; 
determining contract type; developing the solicitation document; determining proposal 
evaluation criteria and contract award strategy; structuring contract terms and conditions; 
and finalizing solicitation documents (Rendon & Snider, 2008). Award fee contracts may 
use sealed bidding procedures as governed by FAR Part 14, Sealed Bidding or negotiated 
procurement procedures as governed by FAR Part 15, Contracting by Negotiation, as 
well as sole source. A cost–benefit analysis must be conducted to ensure that the 
anticipated benefits from the award fee outweigh the additional administrative costs. The 
contract type is either CPAF or FPAF. The remaining elements of the solicitation 
planning phase result in the development of an award fee plan that identifies the award 
fee criteria, methods of evaluation, method of fee determination, and organizational 
structure for award fee administration. The solicitation planning phase concludes with the 
finalization of solicitation documents, to include the award fee plan. 
3. Solicitation 
The solicitation phase consists of advertisement of the procurement opportunity; 
conducting pre-proposal conferences, if required; and developing and maintaining a 
qualified bidder’s list (Rendon & Snider, 2008). Typically, for any contract action 
exceeding $25,000, the solicitation must be synopsized and posted in the government-
wide point of entry known as federal business opportunities (FedBizOpps) (FAR 5.1). 
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The award fee plan is included as an attachment to the request for proposal. Responding 
offerors submit proposals for evaluation during the source selection phase.   
4. Source Selection 
The source selection phase consists of evaluation of proposals against evaluation 
criteria; negotiations with suppliers; and execution of the award strategy (Rendon & 
Snider, 2008). Negotiated award fee contracts involve exchanges between buyers and 
sellers to clarify and come to agreement on terms and conditions; cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives; and other unique contract items relevant to individual contracts. 
The source selection phase concludes with the award of the contract to the selected 
source.   
5. Contract Administration 
According to Rendon and Snider (2008), the contract administration phase 
typically includes “conducting a pre-performance conference, monitoring the contractor’s 
work results, measuring contractor’s performance, and managing the contract change-
control process” (p. 176). The buyer and seller review the award fee plan during the pre-
performance conference to ensure mutual understanding of the award fee criteria, the 
evaluation methodology for the criteria, and the periods of performance during which the 
criteria are reviewed. The buyer uses performance monitors to track and document seller 
performance against the agreed upon evaluation criteria. Depending on the structure of 
the award fee performance evaluation plan, contractors may submit self-assessments to 
aid in award fee evaluation. The performance monitor’s assessments and, if applicable, 
the contractor’s self-assessment are reviewed by the award fee evaluation board. The 
award fee evaluation board (AFEB) provides an assessment and recommends award fee 
amount to the fee determining official (FDO) for consideration. The FDO considers the 
AFEB assessment and recommendations and makes a final determination of the fee 
amount. The determined fee is awarded to the contractor through a contract modification 
by the contracting officer. Each award fee period of performance follows this process 
until contract completion or termination.   
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6. Contract Closeout or Termination 
Contract performance can end for different reasons. Despite the method of 
contract conclusion, all contracts must be closed out. The contract closeout phase 
“includes activities such as the processing of government property dispositions, final 
acceptance of products or services, final contractor payments, and documentation of 
contractor’s final past performance report” (Rendon & Snider, 2008, p. 180). The final 
award fee is paid to the contractor through a contract modification. The contractor’s 
performance is documented in the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System 
(CPARS), and the remaining activities in contract closeout are completed. The 
contracting officer uses the Department of Defense Form 1597, Contract Closeout 
Checklist to verify completion of all closeout activities. The next section discusses the 
government policy on award fee contracts.    
D.  CONTRACT STRUCTURE ELEMENTS 
This study focuses on the following contract structure elements: contract type, 
acquisition life-cycle phase, source selection method, product type, and contract total 
dollar value. The following is a summary of each contract structure element mentioned.    
1. Contract Type 
Defense contracts fall into two general types: cost-reimbursement and fixed-price 
(FAR 16.101). Cost-reimbursement contracts pay the contractor for allowable costs they 
incur. The contractor can be reimbursed up to a predetermined ceiling cost. Fixed-price 
contracts pay the contractor a negotiated amount regardless of what costs they incur. 
Award fees can be incorporated in both cost-reimbursement and fixed-price contracts. In 
both instances, award fees provide for an additional profit to be made if the contractor 
meets predetermined criteria. 
2. Acquisition Life-Cycle Phase 
According to Cochrane and Brown (2010), there are five phases programs 
progress through: (1) Material and Solution Analysis Phase, (2) Technology 
Development Phase, (3) Engineering & Manufacturing Development Phase, (4) 
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Production & Deployment Phase, and (5) Operations & Support Phase. In general, the 
first two phases involve research and development of material solutions for a 
requirement. The system parameters are not well-defined and are still being tweaked. In 
Phase 3, the Engineering & Manufacturing Development Phase, a material solution is 
identified and designed to fulfill the requirement. In the last two phases, the system is 
refined, built, fielded and supported until disposal. Early life-cycle phases have the 
greatest risk as solutions are being developed (Allen, 2008). Over time, risk will decrease 
and become manageable as the solution enters the Production & Deployment phase.  
3. Source Selection Method 
The criteria to select the best contract offer are either lowest price technically 
acceptable (LPTA) or trade-off/best value. For LPTA, the contractor with the lowest 
price offer that meets the government minimum requirement is selected. Price/cost is the 
determining factor for selecting the winning bidder. For best value strategies, trade-offs 
can occur between cost, price, and other non-price factors, such as past performance and 
technical capability (FAR 15.101). A best value selection affords the government the 
opportunity to select a contractor on criteria other than solely price/cost.  
4. Product Type 
Contracts can be used to procure two general product types, services or material. 
This study does not consider a third product type, construction contracts. Award fee 
contracts are used for all product types, but are well suited for complex products, as 
discussed in section B. (Purpose and Goals of Award Fees) of this chapter.   
5. Contract Dollar Value 
Award fee contracts increase administration requirements, making their 
applicability to smaller dollar value contracts less beneficial. A large dollar value contract 
better justifies the increased administrative cost associated with award fee contracts. 
Considerations for the use of award fee contracts are further discussed in the next section.   
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E. GOVERNMENT POLICY ON AWARD FEE CONTRACTS  
This section discusses the statutory and regulatory policies that govern award fee 
contracts. The FAR, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), 
and the DFARS-Procedures, Guidance, and Information (PGI) serve as the primary 
sources of policy for government contracting. This policy review focuses on the 
following topics: general policy and definition of incentive contracts, general policy on 
award fee contracts, CPAF policies, and FPAF policies.    
1. General Policy and Definition of Incentive Contracts  
The FAR defines award fee contracts as a type of incentive contract. FAR 16.401 
adds that incentive contracts: 
are appropriate when a firm-fixed-price contract is not appropriate and the 
required supplies or services can be acquired at lower costs and, in certain 
instances, with improved delivery or technical performance, by relating 
the amount of profit or fee payable under the contract to the contractor’s 
performance. 
The FAR requires that: 
Incentive contracts are designed to obtain specific acquisition objectives 
by—  
(1) Establishing reasonable and attainable targets that are clearly 
communicated to the contractor; and  
(2) Including appropriate incentive arrangements designed to—  
 (i) motivate contractor efforts that might not otherwise be 
emphasized; and  
 (ii) discourage contractor inefficiency and waste. (FAR 16.401) 
This policy ensures that the added costs provide incentives to motivate contractor 
performance towards a specific government acquisition objective. FAR 16.4 clarifies this 
by requiring that, for formula-type incentives, incentives are applied to performance that 
exceeds the minimum performance requirement. The FAR does not allow incentive 
payments for expected or minimum performance on these types of incentive structures 
but does for award fee incentives. The FAR allows for incentives on fixed-price or cost-
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reimbursement contracts. DFARS 216.4 requires the use of objective criteria, associated 
with cost-plus-incentive-fee and fixed-price-incentive-fee contracts, to be used to the 
maximum extent possible. The DFARS adds that when both subjective and objective 
incentives are in the best interest of the Government, a multiple-incentive contract 
structure should be used. Additionally, the FAR requires that a determination and finding 
(D&F) is completed for all incentive and award fee contracts. The D&F must provide the 
justification for the use of the incentive or award fee contract as “in the best interest of 
the Government” (FAR 16.401(d)). The FAR provides more detailed guidance on award 
fee contracts, as discussed in the next section.  
2. General Policy on Award Fee Contracts 
The FAR identifies policies for the application of award fees, determination of 
award fee amount, administrative requirements for the award fee plan, rollover of 
unearned fees, and limitations on awarding the award fee. This section addresses each of 
these policy elements and incorporates regulatory guidance from the DFARS and 
DFARS-PGI. 
3. Application of Award Fees 
The FAR identifies certain conditions in which award fees are suitable for use. 
According to the FAR, award fees are suitable when the following conditions exist: 
(i) The work to be performed is such that it is neither feasible nor effective 
to devise predetermined objective incentive targets applicable to cost, 
schedule, and technical performance;  
(ii) The likelihood of meeting acquisition objectives will be enhanced by 
using a contract that effectively motivates the contractor toward 
exceptional performance and provides the Government with the flexibility 
to evaluate both actual performance and the conditions under which it was 
achieved; and  
(iii) Any additional administrative effort and cost required to monitor and 
evaluate performance are justified by the expected benefits as documented 
by a risk and cost benefit analysis to be included in the Determination and 
Findings referenced in 16.401(e)(5)(iii). (FAR 16.401, (e)(1)) 
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The first condition reinforces the incentives general policy requirement to 
consider objective criteria first when developing incentive contracts. DFARS-PGI 216.4 
requires that contracting officers consult with PMs and FDOs when developing award fee 
plans for contracts that will not use objective criteria. This condition also addresses the 
requirement to link incentives to specific acquisition objectives such as cost, schedule, 
and technical performance. The DFARS-PGI further requires that the “award fee criteria 
shall be linked directly to contract cost, schedule, and performance outcome objectives” 
(DFARS 216.401 (e)(i)).   
The next condition requires analysis of the likelihood of the award fee to motivate 
contractors to achieve the government’s specific acquisition objective. The DFARS-PGI 
offers guidance to assist in this analysis by requiring that 
award fees must be tied to identifiable interim outcomes, discrete events or 
milestones, as much as possible. Examples of such interim milestones 
include timely completion of preliminary design review, critical design 
review, and successful system demonstration. In situations where there 
may be no identifiable milestone for a year or more, consideration should 
be given to apportioning some of the award fee pool for a predetermined 
interim period of time based on assessing progress toward milestones. In 
any case, award fee provisions must clearly explain how a contractor’s 
performance will be evaluated. (DFARS 216.401(e)(1)) 
Linking award fees to these interim outcomes, events, or milestones increases the 
likelihood that the fee will motivate the contractor to exceptional performance. The key 
to achieving the likelihood of meeting acquisition objectives is clearly defining the 
objective, how performance towards the objective will be achieved, and ensuring that the 
award fee provides an adequate incentive to motivate the contractor towards exceptional 
performance.   
The last condition requires the identification of additional administrative costs 
associated with the award fee and an analysis of that cost against the expected benefit. 
Monitoring and evaluation of award fee criteria requires additional administrative efforts. 
The FAR requires that these efforts are monetized and compared against a monetized 
valuation of the anticipated benefits. In addition, the FAR requires a risk assessment to 
determine the likelihood and impact of a contractor not meeting the award fee criteria. 
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The cost–benefit analysis and risk assessment are required elements in the D&F for the 
award fee. If the previous three conditions are satisfied, the amount of the award fee is 
determined using the policy discussed in the next section.  
4. Determination of Award Fee Amount 
The FAR and DFARS provide guidance and limitations on the amount of award 
fee to be earned. The FAR requires that the award fee is “commensurate with the 
contractor’s overall cost, schedule, and technical performance as measured against 
contract requirements in accordance with the criteria stated in the award fee plan” 
(16.401(e)(2)). Linking the amount of the award fee to the cost, schedule, and technical 
performance requires a cost–benefit analysis to ensure that the amount of the award fee is 
likely to motivate contractor’s performance to achieve desired acquisition outcomes. The 
DFARS provides further restrictions on the amount of the award fee by requiring the 
establishment of an award fee pool. The award fee pool is the total amount of the possible 
award fee that could be earned during an award fee evaluation period. The DFARS 
requires that “at least 40 per cent of the award fee is available for the final evaluation so 
that the award fee is appropriately distributed over all evaluation periods to incentivize 
the contractor throughout performance of the contract” (DFARS 216.405-2(1)). 
Additionally, the DFARS requires that, if a base fee is used, base fees must be less than 
3% of the estimated contract cost. The FAR requires that the basis of award fee 
determinations be documented in contract files. In addition to documentation, the FAR 
requires that the award fee determinations ensure that contractor performance is at or 
above a satisfactory level, as described in the award fee criteria in the award fee plan. 
These policies are aimed at ensuring the linkage between award fees earned and 
contractor performance towards desired acquisition objectives. The criteria and process 
for the award fee amount is described in each contract’s award fee plan. 
5. Administrative Requirements for the Award Fee Plan 
The FAR requires that all contracts that include award fees have an award fee 
plan and an award fee board. The award fee plan establishes the award fee evaluation 
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procedures, and the award fee board conducts the evaluation. According to the FAR, the 
award fee plan must 
(i) Be approved by the FDO unless otherwise authorized by agency 
procedures;  
(ii) Identify the award fee evaluation criteria and how they are linked to 
acquisition objectives which shall be defined in terms of contract cost, 
schedule, and technical performance. Criteria should motivate the 
contractor to enhance performance in the areas rated, but not at the 
expense of at least minimum acceptable performance in all other areas;  
(iii) Describe how the contractor’s performance will be measured against 
the award fee evaluation criteria;  
(iv) Utilize the adjectival rating and associated description as well as the 
award fee pool earned percentages shown below in Table 2 [FAR, Table 
16-1]. Contracting officers may supplement the adjectival rating 
description. The method used to determine the adjectival rating must be 
documented in the award fee plan;  
(v) Prohibit earning any award fee when a contractor’s overall cost, 
schedule, and technical performance in the aggregate is below satisfactory;  
(vi) Provide for evaluation period(s) to be conducted at stated intervals 
during the contract period of performance so that the contractor will 
periodically be informed of the quality of its performance and the areas in 
which improvement is expected (e.g. six months, nine months, twelve 
months, or at specific milestones);  
(vii) Define the total award fee pool amount and how this amount is 


















Award Fee Pool 
Available To Be 
Earned  Description  
Excellent  91%-100%  Contractor has exceeded almost all of the significant award fee 
criteria and has met overall cost, schedule, and technical performance 
requirements of the contract in the aggregate as defined and measured 
against the criteria in the award fee plan for the award fee evaluation 
period.  
Very Good  76%-90%  Contractor has exceeded many of the significant award fee criteria 
and has met overall cost, schedule, and technical performance 
requirements of the contract in the aggregate as defined and measured 
against the criteria in the award fee plan for the award fee evaluation 
period.  
Good  51%-75%  Contractor has exceeded some of the significant award fee criteria 
and has met overall cost, schedule, and technical performance 
requirements of the contract in the aggregate as defined and measured 
against the criteria in the award fee plan for the award fee evaluation 
period.  
Satisfactory  No Greater Than 
50%  
Contractor has met overall cost, schedule, and technical performance 
requirements of the contract in the aggregate as defined and measured 
against the criteria in the award fee plan for the award fee evaluation 
period.  
Unsatisfactory  0%  Contractor has failed to meet overall cost, schedule, and technical 
performance requirements of the contract in the aggregate as defined 
and measured against the criteria in the award fee plan for the award 
fee evaluation period.  
 
These policies establish the rules for the identification of award fee criteria, how 
the contractor’s performance will be measured against the criteria, how performance will 
be evaluated, and defines the award fee amounts by evaluation period. In addition, these 
policies provide guidance on how to structure the criteria to ensure they are tailored to 
ensure award fees are given for satisfactory or better contractor performance towards 
specific acquisition criteria linked to cost, schedule, and technical performance. The FAR 
adds further restrictions and limitations to award fee use as discussed in the next two 
sections. 
6. Rollover of Unearned Fees 
The term rollover refers to the reallocation of unearned award fee amounts during 
one evaluation period to a subsequent evaluation period. For example, if a contractor’s 
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performance is evaluated to be very good and earns 90% of the evaluation periods award 
fee pool, 10% is left unearned. Previous policy allowed FDOs to reallocate the unearned 
10% of the award fee pool to future evaluation periods. This reallocation is termed 
rollover. Allowing this rollover diminishes the power of the award fee incentive to 
motivate contractor performance. A contractor may not concern themselves with meeting 
acquisition objectives in one evaluation period if they believe that they will have a second 
chance at earning the award fee in a subsequent period. The FAR currently prohibits the 
use of unearned award fees (FAR 16.401(e)(4)).   
7. Award Fee Limitations 
The FAR limits the use of award fee contracts by requiring the completion of an 
award fee plan and a D&F. In addition, for CPAF contracts, the limitations that are 
applicable to cost-reimbursement contracts must be satisfied. FAR limitations on cost-
reimbursement contracts include: must have an adequate contractor’s accounting system; 
must receive appropriate government surveillance to ensure efficient methods and 
effective cost control by the contractor; and must not be a commercial item. The cost-
reimbursement contract limitations only apply to CPAF contracts, not FPAF contracts. 
The award fee plan requirements were discussed previously in the administrative 
requirements for the award fee plan section. The D&F requirements for award fees were 
discussed previously in the general policy and definition of incentive contracts section. 
These limitations restrict the situations in which award fee contracts shall be used. There 
are two types of award fee contracts, CPAF and FPAF, which are detailed in the next two 
sections.   
8. Cost-Plus Award Fee Contract Policies 
The GAO (2009b) identified that 94% of award fee contracts in 2008 were cost- 
plus award fee (CPAF) contracts. The FAR defines a CPAF as    
a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for a fee consisting of (1) a 
base amount fixed at inception of the contract, if applicable and at the 
discretion of the contracting officer, and (2) an award amount that the 
contractor may earn in whole or in part during performance and that is 
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sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in the areas of cost, 
schedule, and technical performance. (FAR 16.405-2) 
The general policies and limitations on award fee contracts outlined in previous sections 
apply to CPAF contracts as well. In addition to those policies and limitations, the DFARS 
provides additional policies for CPAF contracts. 
The DFARS limits the use of CPAF contracts by restricting their use such that 
they are not used to avoid establishing objective targets that could be used in cost-plus-
incentive-fee (CPIF) contracts; to avoid establishing CPFF contracts when corresponding 
criteria can be established; nor for engineering development or operational system 
development contracts in which requirements allow for simultaneous R&D and 
production. The DFARS does, however, allow CPAF contracts for 
individual engineering development or operational system development 
acquisitions ancillary to the development of a major weapon system or 
equipment, where—  
(1)  It is more advantageous; and 
(2) The purpose of the acquisition is clearly to determine or solve specific 
problems associated with the major weapon system or equipment. 
(DFARS 216.405-2(3)(B)) 
These limitations support the policy to prioritize the use of objective criteria and 
evaluation methods to incentivize specific acquisition objectives before using subjective 
measures. This policy guides contracting officers to use objective incentive contract 
vehicles such as CPIF, fixed-price-incentive-firm (FPIF), or CPFF when objective criteria 
and evaluation methods can be established. The DFARS does not allow the use of the 
weighted guidelines method to determine the base fee or the award fee. Lastly, the 
DFARS-PGI provides guidance on contractor performance evaluation through example 
performance evaluation criteria and a sample performance evaluation report in Part 
216.470. The FPAF contract policies are discussed in the next section.     
9. Fixed-Price Award Fee Contract Policies 
The FAR provides very little guidance on the use of FPAF contracts. In general, 
fixed-price contracts place a majority of the cost risk on the contractor. Therefore, the 
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objective of FPAF contracts is typically to incentivize technical performance or delivery. 
FAR Part 16.404 provides the following guidance: 
Award fee provisions may be used in fixed-price contracts when the 
Government wishes to motivate a contractor and other incentives cannot 
be used because contractor performance cannot be measured objectively. 
Such contracts shall establish a fixed price (including normal profit) for 
the effort. This price will be paid for satisfactory contract performance. 
Award fee earned (if any) will be paid in addition to that fixed price. See 
16.401(e) for the requirements relative to utilizing this contract type.  
FAR 16.401(e) covers the general policy requirements for the use of award fee contracts 
as discussed previously in the general policy on award fee contracts. Similar to guidance 
on CPAF contracts, the FAR requires that FPAF contracts are only used if other incentive 
contracts, such as FPIF or FPFF, cannot be used. The next section provides a brief 
summary of the history of award fee contracts in federal procurement.   
F. BRIEF HISTORY 
The history of incentive contracting may trace back to the U.S. Army’s 
procurement of the first flying machine. The Army used an incentive-type contract that 
motivated the Wright brothers to achieve two objective criteria in the development of the 
Wright Flyer in 1908 (Snyder, 2001). Incentive-type contracts, award fee contracts in 
particular, became more prominent in the 1960s. Tremaine (2008) noted that “the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had been largely credited with 
successfully instituting formal incentive contracts since the early 1960s” (p. 223). 
Further, NASA established the first guidance on CPAF contracts in 1967 with its 
issuance of the NASA Cost-Plus Award Fee Contracting Guide, (NHB 5104.4; Nash, 
Cibinic, & Yukins, 2011). Award fee contracts grew in use throughout the 1960s and 
1970s and flourished until recent GAO reports in 2005 and 2006 challenged their 
effectiveness in motivating contractor performance.   
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G. RECENT ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY THE GOVERNMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
INSPECTOR GENERAL  
In 2004, the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services’ Subcommittee 
on Readiness and Management Support asked the GAO to conduct an audit of DOD 
incentive and award fee contracts to “determine whether award fees and incentive fees 
have been used effectively as a management tool for achieving DOD’s desired 
acquisition outcomes” (GAO, 2005, p. 2). The GAO has published numerous reports in 
response to this inquiry and multiple other inquiries on incentives and award fees. The 
key reports discussed in this section include: DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and 
Incentive Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes (GAO-06-66); DOD Wastes Billions 
of Dollars through Poorly Structured Incentives (GAO-06-409T); Guidance on Award 
Fees Has Led to Better Practices but Is Not Consistently Applied (GAO-09-630); and 
Application of OMB Guidance Can Improve Use of Award fee Contracts (GAO-09-
839T). This section discusses the conditions that precipitated the initial inquiry, the major 
findings and recommendation of each report, and then summarizes the agencies’ initial 
responses to GAO recommendations.   
The DOD Inspector General (IG) conducted an audit of CPAF contracts in 1995. 
The IG report concluded the following: 
Award fees contained adequate incentive amounts for contractors to 
reduce costs for the four contracts reviewed. Methods to determine and 
compute award fees were adequate. Contracting officers at Fort Eustis, 
Newport News, Virginia, agreed to reevaluate the type of contract for base 
operating services during the next acquisition cycle in response to 
concerns expressed during the audit. We did not identify any material 
management control weaknesses. In addition, the objectives that 
performance indicators were to achieve were being accomplished through 
the evaluation plans for the contracts’ award fee determination on all four 
contracts reviewed. (DODIG, 1995, p. 1) 
This report presented a favorable view of award fee contracts but perhaps hinted 
at potential issues with award fee structures and administration. The IG audit of award 
fee contract appropriateness identified concerns that “award fee Board scores were not 
always consistent with write-ups in the award criteria factor of performance” (DODIG, 
 30 
1995, p. 4). The report noted that “seven out of nine statements listed under the award 
criteria factor of performance fit the description of average performance” (DODIG, 1995, 
p. 4). The IG assessed that the performance score given was 10–20 points higher than the 
annotated performance statements supported. Further, the IG concluded that these 
“inconsistencies showed a[n] overpayment … of … $608,275” (DODIG, 1995, p. 4). 
Another finding indicated that agencies failed to properly reevaluate contract type 
selection for follow-on contracts. Contract actions that were originally cost-
reimbursement type contracts, but subsequently established adequate pricing histories 
through contract execution, were remaining CPAF contracts. These findings parallel the 
issues that led to the conditions for the congressional inquiries that prompted the GAO 
audits.   
The issues identified in the IG report manifest the conditions that precipitated the 
congressional inquiry into the DOD’s use of incentives and award fee contracts. Prior to 
the 2004 congressional inquiry, the GAO provided previous reports that showed 
“fundamental acquisition problems within the DOD, especially a lack of key product 
knowledge at critical junctures, have contributed to such issues as cost increases, 
schedule delays, and performance shortfalls in weapons programs” (GAO, 2005, p. 1). 
These issues resonated with top DOD and acquisition executives who “raised concerns 
about how effectively these [incentive and award] fees are being used because DOD 
programs have paid contractors large amounts of fee on acquisitions that are falling 
behind schedule, overrunning costs, and experiencing significant technical problems” 
(GAO, 2005, p. 2). Marquee programs that used award fee contracts, such as the Joint 
Strike Fighter tactical fighter aircraft, Comanche reconnaissance attack helicopter, and 
F/A-22 Raptor tactical fighter aircraft were either being canceled or facing significant 
schedule delays and cost overruns. This troubling state of DOD acquisitions prompted the 
congressional inquiry into DOD incentives and award fee contracts.  
The GAO’s first report on the DOD’s use of award and incentive fees bluntly 
stated, in the title, that the “DOD has paid billions in awards and incentive fees regardless 
of acquisition outcomes” (GAO, 2005). In response to the inquiry, the GAO (2005) 
reviewed a sample of 93 award and incentive fee contracts, out of a population of 597 
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contracts, with a contract dollar value of $10 million or greater. Of those contracts, 52 
had only award fee line items, 27 contracts had only incentive fee elements, and 14 
contracts had both award and incentive fee provisions (GAO, 2005). The report identified 
the following issues in the DOD’s use of award and incentive fees:  
• Payment of award fee is not linked to acquisition outcomes such as cost, 
schedule, and performance; 
 
• Contractors are afforded additional opportunities to receive unearned 
award fee, known as rollover fees; 
 
• Large percentage of fees paid are for “acceptable, average, expected, 
good, or satisfactory” performance; 
 
• Lessons learned and best practices are not shared at agency level; the 
DOD does not collect data on award fee use; 
 
• DOD does not have a method to evaluate the performance of award fee 
contracts. (GAO, 2005)  
The report findings were an indictment of the DOD’s use of incentive and award fee 
contracts. The GAO contended that the DOD wasted billions of dollars by paying, on 
average, 90% of the award and incentive fee, despite not meeting cost or schedule targets 
in some instances and giving contractors second opportunities to earn unpaid incentive 
and award fees (GAO, 2005). In the sample, the GAO (2005) found that award fee 
payments ranged from a low of 36% to a high of 100% paid. 
To address these findings, the GAO offered seven recommendations to the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]). The 
seven recommendations provided to the USD(AT&L) by the GAO (2005) to improve the 
link between incentive and outcomes are as follows: 
1. Instructing the military services to move toward more outcome-based 
award fee criteria that are both achievable and promote accountability for 
acquisition outcomes;  
 
2. Ensuring that award fee structures are motivating excellent contractor 




3. Requiring the appropriate approving officials to review new contracts to 
make sure these actions are being taken. DOD can improve its use of 
award[-]fees on all existing contracts by;  
 
4. Issuing DOD guidance on when rollover is appropriate. In the longer term, 
DOD can improve its use of award and incentive fees by; 
 
5. Developing a mechanism for capturing award- and incentive-fee data 
within existing data systems, such as the Defense Acquisition 
Management Information Retrieval system;  
 
6. Developing performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of award 
and incentive fees as a tool for improving contractor performance and 
achieving desired program outcomes;  
 
7. Developing a mechanism to share proven incentive strategies for the 
acquisition of different types of products and services with contracting and 
program officials across DOD. (p. 5) 
The DOD concurred with the GAO and agreed to implement policy changes to 
address Recommendations 1, 4, and 7. The DOD agreed to address these three 
recommendations in a follow-on policy memorandum. The DOD partially concurred with 
the remaining four recommendations. The DOD disagreed with the GAO’s assessment of 
only paying award fees for above satisfactory performance and stated that “it was both 
fair and reasonable to pay a portion of the award fee for this level of performance, but 
agreed that the preponderance of fee should be paid for excellent performance and that it 
would reinforce existing policies in its March memorandum” (GAO, 2005, p. 5). The 
next GAO report provided further insight into the issues identified in GAO-06-66 through 
the statement of the Comptroller General of the United States to the Subcommittee on 
Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate.    
In GAO 06-409T, the Comptroller General of the United States asserts that the 
“DOD wastes billions of dollars through poorly structured incentives,” as noted in the 
title of the report, and provides recommendations to address this problem (GAO, 2006). 
In this report, the GAO claimed that “DOD programs routinely engage in award fee 
practices that do not hold contractors accountable for achieving desired outcomes and 
undermine efforts to motivate contractor performance” (GAO, 2006, Highlights). The 
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GAO (2006) pointed to the same issues identified in GAO-06-66 (GAO, 2005) as the 
underlying causes of this claim, but highlighted the following practices as symptomatic: 
• Evaluating contractors on award fee criteria that are not directly related to 
key acquisition outcomes (e.g., meeting cost and schedule goals and 
delivering desired capabilities to the warfighter); 
• Paying contractors a significant portion of the available fee for what award 
fee plans describe as “acceptable, average, expected, good, or satisfactory” 
performance;  
• Giving contractors at least a second opportunity to earn initially unearned 
or deferred fees. (GAO, 2006, Highlights) 
This report reiterated the recommendations provided to the USD(AT&L) in GAO-06-66. 
Prior to the release of this report, the Office of the USD(AT&L; OUSD[AT&L]) released 
a policy memorandum to address Recommendations 1, 2, 4, and 7 in the GAO-06-66 
report. In 2007, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a memorandum for 
chief acquisition officers and senior procurement executives that provided guidance on 
the use of incentives in contracts. These memorandums are discussed in a subsequent 
section. The next section covers a GAO report that assesses agencies’ actions in response 
to the OMB policy memorandum.   
The GAO generated report GAO-09-630, Guidance on Award Fees Has Led to 
Better Practices but Is Not Consistently Applied, in response to various requests from 
Congress. Congress members requested that the GAO determine “whether the new 
emphasis on award fees has improved DOD’s and NASA’s use of these fees and whether 
other agencies were implementing OMB’s guidance” (GAO, 2009b, p. 2). The requests 
specifically asked the GAO to audit the following: 
(1) identify the actions agencies have taken to revise or develop policies 
and guidance to reflect OMB guidance on using award fees, (2) determine 
whether current practices for using award fee contracts are consistent with 
the new guidance, and (3) determine the extent that agencies are collecting 
and analyzing information on award fees to evaluate their use and sharing 
that information within their agencies. (GAO, 2009b, p. 2) 
This section focuses only on the GAO assessment of the DOD’s actions in implementing 
OMB’s guidance.   
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The GAO found that the DOD revised or reemphasized policies to be generally 
consistent with OMB guidance. The report indicated that the DOD had issued guidance 
that stated “that award fees must be linked to desired outcomes, defines the level of 
performance used to evaluate contractors, and prohibits payment of award fees to 
contractors for unsatisfactory performance” (GAO, 2009b, p. 3). Additionally, the GAO 
identified that the DOD established a community of practice (CoP) through the Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) to share lessons learned, best practices, and other 
information about incentives and award fee contracts with acquisition professionals. The 
GAO also reported favorably that the DOD established procedures to gather performance 
measurement data on incentive and award fee contracts.   
Despite the DOD’s positive policy changes, the GAO found that many acquisition 
professionals in the agencies were not familiar with the new DOD guidance or the OMB 
guidance. This failure to effectively promulgate new DOD policy likely accounts for the 
GAO’s subsequent finding that many practices in the DOD, at the time, were still not in 
line with the OMB guidance. For example, despite providing guidance to limit the use of 
rollover award fees, the GAO found that “some programs continue[d] to roll over 
unearned award fees and award up to 84% of available award fees for satisfactory 
performance” (GAO, 2009b, pp. 3-4). The GAO concluded their report with the 
recommendation that the DOD continue to apply its guidance and work with other 
agencies to develop performance measurement methods and successful strategies.   
The final GAO report discussed in this section, GAO-09-839T, Application of 
OMB Guidance Can Improve Use of Award Fee Contracts,” provided a summary of the 
GAO-09-630 report discussed above. This report encapsulated the statement of the 
Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management. His statement alludes to the fact that 
the DOD was ahead of some agencies in implementing OMB guidance, likely due to their 
response to the previous audit by the GAO as reported in GAO-06-66 in 2005. The 
Director recommends that the five agencies involved in the report form an interagency 
working group to “identify how best to evaluate the effectiveness of award fees as a tool 
for improving contractor performance and achieving desired program outcomes and ... 
develop methods for sharing information on successful strategies” (GAO, 2009a, p. 8).    
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H. DOD, LEGISLATIVE, AND OMB RESPONSES TO GAO AUDITS 
The DOD responded to the GAO audit reports through policy reviews, policy 
changes, establishing a community of practice, commissioning a research study, and 
issuing updates to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 
Procedures, Guidance, and Information (PGI). The John Warner National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007 included guidance to link award and 
incentive fees to acquisition outcomes. OMB issued a memorandum with guidance on the 
appropriate use of incentive contracts (NDAA, 2006). These responses altered the use of 
award fee contracts. This section highlights policy changes and legislative requirements 
and discusses their impacts. This section is organized in chronological order and starts 
with the first memorandum issued by the USD(AT&L) in response to the GAO-06-66 
report (GAO, 2005). 
The USD(AT&L) issued guidance through a policy memorandum titled Award 
Fee Contracts (FAR 16, DFARS 215, DFARS 216) on March 29, 2006 (Finley, 2006). 
This memorandum was the initial response to the GAO-06-66 report and addressed 
Recommendations 1, 2, 4, and 7 contained within that report. The memorandum offered 
guidance that “it is imperative that award fees be tied to identifiable interim outcomes, 
discrete events or milestones, as much as possible” (Finley, 2006, p. 1). The practice of 
providing an award fee for less than satisfactory performance is forbidden, and guidance 
is provided to ensure award fees for satisfactory performance is considerably less than for 
excellent performance. The use of rollover fees is heavily discouraged and guidance is 
given to make its use the exception rather than the rule. Further guidance is given that 
requires Fee Determining Officials to document the rationale for the approval of rollover 
award fees in the contract file. The last recommendation from the GAO-06-66 report is 
addressed with the announcement of the establishment of “the ‘Award and Incentive 
Fees’ Community of Practice (CoP) under the leadership of the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU)” (Finley, 2006, p. 2). The memorandum concluded with the 
notification that the DFARS and its PGI would be updated to reflect the guidance 
provided.  The acquisition workforce execution of this policy resulted in the reduction in 
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the use of award and incentive fee contracts by 46% in 2007 and 85% in 2008 across the 
DOD (Rutherford, 2009). 
The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 
codified some of the GAO recommendations into law. This law required that the 
Secretary of Defense issue guidance on the appropriate use of award and incentive fees 
within 180 days of its enactment (NDAA, 2006). The law further required that the 
instructions in the guidance:  
• Link fees to acquisition outcomes defined in terms of program cost, 
schedule, and performance;  
 
• Establish appropriate authorization levels for the approval of award and 
incentive fee use;  
 
• Define rating standards descriptions and associated percentage of award 
fee pool to be paid for the corresponding rating; establish the percentage 
of award fee pool available to be awarded for “satisfactory” performance;  
 
• Ensure no award fee is paid for below satisfactory performance; 
 
• Provide direction on the use of award fee rollover; ensure consistency in 
guidance and definitions for use of award and incentive fees amongst all 
DOD entities;  
 
• Ensures that the DOD collects data on award and incentive fee use and 
evaluates the data on a regular basis;  
 
• Includes a method to evaluate the effectiveness of award and incentive fee 
use in meeting program objectives by motivating contractor performance;  
 
• Establish a method to share proven strategies (NDAA, 2006).  
The law further directed that the Secretary of Defense implement a research study 
to assess possible independent research mechanisms and report the findings within one 
year after enactment.              
The USD(AT&L) responded to the requirements in the John Warner National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 by issuing a policy memorandum titled 
Proper Use of Award fee Contracts and Award Fee Provisions on April 24, 2007 (Assad, 
2007). This memorandum provided guidance to utilize objective criteria to measure 
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contract performance when possible (Assad, 2007). In addition, guidance was provided 
that if objective criteria could not be developed and the use of a CPAF was still 
appropriate, the Head of the Contracting Activity (HCA) would have to sign a 
determination and finding (D&F; Assad, 2007). Further, tables with the award fee 
adjectival ratings, definitions, and corresponding award fee pool earning percentages 
were delivered for use in all future award fee contracts. Table 2 provides the ratings, 
percentages, and descriptions as listed in the memorandum and captured in the FAR. The 
memorandum concluded by noting that these policies were in effect as of August 1, 2007 
and that they would be incorporated into the DFARS or DFARS-PGI.  
In 2006, the DOD asked DAU to conduct a research study in response to the 
GAO-06-66 report (GAO, 2005). The purpose of the study was to “determine what 
generally afforded strong correlations between incentive-type contracts and expected 
performance outcomes” (Tremaine, 2008, p. 217). The goal of the report was to identify a 
proven technique in linking award fees to desirable outcomes effectively and share the 
results with the acquisition community. The research consisted of a review of the GAO-
06-66 report, follow-up discussions with the GAO, interviews with 25 weapon system 
acquisition program representatives, and analysis of program practices with program 
effectiveness. The research found a correlation between the contractor’s meeting 
desirable outcome objectives and certain practices as outlined in the following summary 
of findings: 
• Strongly Communicated Expectations and Feedback: Frequent and 
unambiguous communication/feedback made a noticeable difference for 
incentive contracts.   
 
• Key measures can validate whether or not a program achieved certain 
necessary intermediate milestones along a program’s critical glide path. 
 
• The incorporation of base fee in award fee contracts made a noticeable 
difference. 
 
• Trained and Experienced Personnel made a noticeable difference for 
incentive contracts. (Tremaine, 2008, pp. 228–233) 
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The research study recommended revising workforce training to incorporate the findings 
in the study into mandatory acquisition workforce training curricula and provide positive 
examples of these practices on the DAU CoP.   
I. OTHER RESEARCH ON AWARD FEES 
Award fees and their use has been the subject of research for the past few 
decades. Schade (1990) conducted research on the use of FPAF contracts using 
economic, motivational, and contracting theory. Schade used surveys provided to 
government and private industry representatives to determine the most effective use of 
FPAF contracts. His findings concluded that FPAF contracts provided the advantages of 
better communication between the government and private industry while enhancing the 
industrial base through larger profits that may in turn be invested in research and 
development for future governmental business (Schade, 1990). Schade (1990) also found 
that FPAF contracts required added government administration requirements and may be 
subject to contractors gaming proposals by providing minimum performance standards in 
anticipation of being able to show improvement to earn the award fee. His ultimate 
conclusion was that FPAF contracts can motivate contractor performance when applied 
properly.  
Hearns and Mitchell (2007) surveyed the acquisition workforce to determine their 
response to GAO’s reports on poorly structured award and incentive fees in the DOD. 
They surveyed contract managers at the National Contract Management Association 
(NCMA) 45th Annual Aerospace and Defense Contract Management Conference to 
gather feedback on the GAO reports. Their findings determined that about half of the 
acquisition workforce respondents agreed with the GAO findings that the DOD use of 
award fees does not motivate contractors to achieve acquisition outcomes, that a 
significant portion of the award fees were given for satisfactory performance, and that 
DOD uses rollover of fees (Hearns & Mitchell, 2007). Additional findings indicated that 
DOD required “improvement in the areas of training, administration, and implementation 
of award and incentive fees” (Hearns & Mitchell, 2007, p. 2). They offered that contract 
managers should form a partnership between the government and contractors to facilitate 
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communication and open communication in order to share risk and ensure cost and 
schedule objectives (Hearns & Mitchell, 2007).   
The last research included in this literature review was conducted by Ricks, 
Roberston, and Jolliffe (2013). Ricks, et al. used an acquisition workforce survey and 
literature review to identify alternative methods to award fee contracts or best practices in 
the current use of award fee contracts. Their findings concluded that the success of award 
fee contracts depended on the following resource factors: funding, technology, 
leadership, and agency or military service culture (Ricks, et al., 2013). They identified 
adequate workforce training as the most critical factor to award fee contract success 
(Ricks, et al., 2013). Their recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the use of 
award fee contracts included development of agency standard operating procedures with 
detailed evaluation criteria development, better guidance on contract award fee 
administration, and improved workforce training (Ricks et al., 2013).   
J. SUMMARY  
This chapter provided a summary of award fee literature, prior research, and 
government policies and assessments. The first section discussed the purpose and goals 
of award fee contracts as an incentive mechanism to motivate contractor performance. 
The next section explained how award fee contracting relates to the key functions in the 
six phases of the contracting process. The following section summarized the government 
policies on award fee contracting. A brief history of award fee use in government was 
provided in section E. Section F discussed recent issues with award fee use in DOD 
contracting as identified by the GAO and DODIG. The next section provided a summary 
of the DOD, legislative, and OMB response to GAO audits. The last section provided a 
summary of other research conducted on award fee contracting.  
When properly structured, administered, and executed, award fees incentivize 
contractors towards cooperative behavior that achieves specified acquisition objectives in 
complex contracts. In order to achieve this behavior, award fee criteria must be well 
defined and linked to the desired outcomes, must be objectively measured in a manner 
understood by both parties, and must have award fee amounts that are commensurate 
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with the contractor’s motivations to achieve the desired outcomes. DOD, legislative, and 
OMB reforms have aligned award fee policies to assist in achieving the specificity 
required to structure award fees to achieve their intended purpose. The next chapter 
includes a discussion of the methodology used in this research to determine whether the 




This chapter discusses the methodology used to conduct this study. Research was 
conducted in three phases: planning, data collection, and data analysis. The approach was 
modeled after Naegle’s, Analysis Planning Methodology: For Thesis, Joint Applied 
Projects, & Master of Business Administration (MBA) Research Reports (Naegle, 2014).  
The planning phase began after the research topic was identified. The first step of 
planning was developing research questions that would guide the data collection plan. 
The questions were constructed to extract the information necessary to answer the 
research topic. The research questions are discussed in Chapter I, Section C of this report. 
The next step of the planning phase was developing a research matrix (Naegle, 2014). For 
this research a data source matrix (DSM) spreadsheet was created using Microsoft Excel. 
The spreadsheet included columns for each data element to be filled in while examining 
contract files. Many of the Excel cells have pre-established drop-down boxes to simplify 
and standardize data entry. The appendix is provided to illustrate a completed section of 
the DSM. Utilizing the pre-established cells in the spreadsheet identifies potential data 
availability issues, provides a data collection rehearsal, helps to recognize missing data 
elements, and flushes out poorly constructed research questions.   
The next phase is the data collection phase. The researchers selected a command 
from the Navy to collect the data. This command executes large dollar value, major 
defense system programs for the Navy. Thirteen contracts that contained at least one 
award fee contract line item number (CLIN) were selected from a total sample pool of 31 
contracts. The contracts needed to have EVM data reporting requirements and contractor 
performance rating submissions to provide measures of contract success.  
Only contracts that were awarded during or after FY2008 were selected. FY2008 
marks when the majority of DOD policy changes regarding award fees were 
implemented. Contracts awarded prior to FY2008 were likely following obsolete 
guidance. Another stipulation is the contract has to have been awarded prior to February 
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2014. This provides sufficient time for the contractor to have received a performance 
rating submission, multiple EVM data collection points, and at least one award fee 
decision to have occurred. All three of these criteria need to be recorded to achieve a 
complete a data set. A contract awarded within the last year will be missing one or 
possibly all of these key components. 
Once all the data was captured on the DSM, the last phase was data analysis. 
Using the data gathered, correlation and correlation models were run using Microsoft 
Excel and data analysis functions. This process allows multiple arrays of data to be 
selected and compared to each other. The output is the correlation coefficient, a number 
that falls between negative one and one (Bluman, 1995). The closer the number is to 
negative one or one, the stronger the correlation is between the two fields. Negative one 
represents a negative correlation, where the two fields have an inverse relationship. As 
one field increases in value, the other field will equally decrease. Likewise, a correlation 
coefficient of one represents a relationship where as one field increases, the other field 
equally increases. Fields with a correlation coefficient close to zero either have a weak or 
no relationship (Bluman, 1995). Analyzing correlation can only be accomplished between 
fields with numerical values. The following sections discuss the data fields, where the 
information originated and how they were analyzed.   
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DATA SOURCE MATRIX (DSM) 
1. ACQUISITION LIFE CYCLE 
This section illustrates how the acquisition life-cycle phase was determined and 
the linkage to award fee contracts. The acquisition life cycle is the process through which 
a product evolves from infancy to disposal. There are five phases of the acquisition life 
cycle that were discussed in Chapter II, Section D.2. Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1 
programs are required to submit a Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) on an annual basis 
(Cochrane & Brown, 2010). Some ACAT 1 programs may require greater visibility and 
submit SARs quarterly. SARs provide cost, schedule, and performance information about 
a program to include the current acquisition life-cycle phase. All ACAT 1 programs are 
considered major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs); however, some MDAPs are 
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not ACAT 1 programs and therefore do not require SAR submission. In most cases, the 
acquisition life-cycle phase will be obtained from the program SAR. In cases where the 
program does not submit SARs, the contract will be analyzed to make that determination. 
The specific contract language will suggest the acquisition life-cycle phase of the 
program. This information was analyzed to see the acquisition phase where award fee use 
is more prevalent. It was expected that earlier life-cycle phases would be more conducive 
to using award fee contracts.  
2. CONTRACT ELEMENTS 
This section explains the contract document and what contract elements can be 
extracted to analyze award fees. The contract document was used to obtain several data 
elements; these include: the type of contract used, the contract deliverable, the source 
selection criteria used to choose the best offer, a breakdown of each individual contract 
line item number (CLIN), and the total dollar value of the contract. Government contracts 
follow a standardized format called the Uniform Contract Format (UCF). All of the 
previously mentioned elements can be found in “the schedule,” Sections A–H, Part I, 
with the exception of source selection criteria, which is found in Section M, Part IV, 
“evaluation factors for award” (FAR 15.204). The type of contract was annotated as 
either cost-reimbursement or fixed-price. The contract deliverable also had two options, 
either service or material. The source selection criteria were summarized as lowest price 
technically acceptable (LPTA), trade off, or sole source. Section M of each contract was 
analyzed to determine the source selection method utilized. The number of award fee 
CLINs was determined by reviewing each CLIN and counting CLINs with award fee 
provisions. The total dollar value of the contract was located in Section B, Part I of the 
contracts and documented in the DSM. These contract elements can be found in every 
award fee contract.  
3. AWARD FEE PLAN 
This section discusses the award fee plan (AFP), award fee board, award fee 
criteria, and fee determining official’s (FDO) role in the award fee process. AFPs contain 
the following data elements essential to the research: award fee pool dollars available, 
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award fee percentage paid, award fee payment criteria, and an explanatory statement 
describing payment or non-payment of award fees. Award fees are determined using a 
review board structure. The AFP identifies members of an award fee board. The award 
fee board periodically meets to assess contractor performance against criteria established 
in the AFP. Based on the board’s analysis, they submit a recommendation on how much 
award fee a contractor should earn to the FDO. The FDO will consider the award fee 
board’s recommendation and ultimately decide on the amount of award fee to be paid to 
the contractor (FAR 16.001). In this study, the award fee board recommendations and 
FDO decisions were recorded as the dollar amount paid to the contractor. That dollar 
amount will be divided by the total available award fee pool to calculate the percentage 
of available award fee pool paid. This calculation was annotated as the award fee 
percentage paid.  
4. EARNED VALUE MANAGEMENT 
This section discusses how earned value management (EVM) information was 
used to study award fee relationships to contract success. EVM is a programmatic tool 
based on commercial industry, American National Standards Institute/Electronic 
Industries Alliance Standard 748 (ANSI/EIA-748) guidelines (Cochrane & Brown, 
2010). EVM “integrates all contract work scope, cost and schedule objectives in a single 
performance baseline” (Rendon & Snider, 2008, p. 233). DOD utilizes EVM to track and 
forecast program progress. EVM data is archived in the Defense Acquisition 
Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) system and maintained by program offices 
on major defense programs (ACAT 1). EVM data is also available on fee determining 
official (FDO) documents in some cases. Four EVM metrics would prove valuable to this 
study: cost variance percent (CV%), schedule variance percent (SV%), cost performance 
index (CPI), and schedule performance index (SPI). CV% and CPI measure whether a 
program is operating under budget or over budget. SV% and SPI measure a program with 
regard to schedule overrun or underrun. The data was listed as the exact numerical value 
provided on either the FDO document or in DAMIR.  
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CPI and SPI can be categorized by using the rating scale provided in FAR 16.401 
for contractor performance. To compare CPI and SPI with the FAR adjectival ratings, 
Figure 1, the Sherman Lipscomb EVM Performance Matrix (SLEPM) was developed by 
the researchers based on award fee plan criteria of an MDAP. This tool allows conversion 
of numerical values obtained in FDO documents and DAMIR to adjectival ratings. The 
values associated with each adjectival rating are not approved in acquisition policy, but 
were determined based on a reasonable expectation of a program’s cost and schedule 







Good Good Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 
0.97 0.94 0.91 0.88 0.85 
Excellent 0.97 0.9409 0.9118 0.8827 0.8536 0.8245 
Very Good 0.94 0.9118 0.8836 0.8554 0.8272 0.799 
Good 0.91 0.8827 0.8554 0.8281 0.8008 0.7735 
Satisfactory 0.88 0.8536 0.8272 0.8008 0.7744 0.748 
Unsatisfactory 0.85 0.8245 0.799 0.7735 0.748 0.7225 
Figure 1.  Sherman Lipscomb EVM Performance Matrix (SLEPM) 
5. CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE RATING 
This section focuses on the contractor performance rating process, the system 
interface to extract data, and how performance rating information was used in this study. 
Contractor performance ratings are an important means to measure a contractor and play 
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an essential role in selecting winning offers of future contracts. According to FAR 
42.1500, Contractor Performance Information, “the fee amount paid to contractors should 
be reflective of the contractor’s performance and the past performance evaluation should 
closely parallel and be consistent with the fee determinations.” Contractor performance is 
required to be annotated after each contract period of performance and during contract 
closeout.  
Contracting officers submit contractor evaluations into an online repository called 
Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). CPARS contains a 
second module, called Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System 
(FAPIIS). According to the PPIRS website, FAPIIS was developed to fulfill the Duncan 
Hunter National Defense Authorization Act requirement to track the “integrity and 
performance of covered Federal agency contractors and grantees (General Services 
Administration [GSA], 2014).” FAPIIS contains information about contract terminations 
and receives suspension/disbarment information from the Excluded Parties List System 
(EPLS). CPARS feeds the information from CPARS and FAPIIS to another database 
titled Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS). In July 2002, the DOD 
endorsed PPIRS as the single, authorized application to retrieve contractor performance 
information (GSA, 2014).  
The FAR requires the following information be recorded regarding a contractor’s 
performance:  
1. Conforming to contract requirements and to standards of good 
workmanship; 
2. Forecasting and controlling costs; 
3. Adherence to schedules, including the administrative aspects of 
performance; 
4. Reasonable and cooperative behavior and commitment to customer 
satisfaction; 
5. Reporting into databases (see subpart 4.14 and reporting requirements in 
the solicitation provisions and clauses referenced in 9.104-7); 
6. Integrity and business ethics;  
7. Business-like concern for the interest of the customer. (FAR 42.1501) 
For this study, contractor performance rating information was extracted from 
PPIRS for each contract in the research sample. Contractors receive ratings in six 
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categories on a 1-to-5 point evaluation scale. The six categories are quality, schedule, 
cost control, business relations, management of key personnel, and utilization of small 
business. The 1-to-5 point evaluation scale is measured with 5 being “exceptional,” 4 
equating to “very good,” 3 equaling “satisfactory,” 2 being “marginal,” and 1 
representing “unsatisfactory” performance. In some cases, the category can be marked as 
“NA,” if that measure was not applicable to contractor performance.  
Wilhite, Stover, and Hart (2013) established a model to determine contract 
success using the same grading criteria. They analyzed 715 contracts to correlate contract 
success with contractor performance assessment ratings. In their study, receiving an 
evaluation score of marginal or unsatisfactory in any one of the six categories labeled the 
entire contract as a failure. Those contracts not determined to be failures were labeled as 
successful (Wilhite et al., 2013). The results are displayed by contract type in Table 3 
below. Wilhite, Stover, and Hart observed a 5.17% contract failure rate out of a sample of 
55 award fee contracts. Of those contracts, failing contractor performance assessment 
ratings were recorded in cost control, business relations, and management of key 
personnel. Wilhite, Stover, and Hart’s contract success and failure model will be utilized 
to determine contract success and failure in this study. 













CPAF 55 3 58 5.17% 
Combination 2 2 4 50% 
CPFF 34 2 36 5.56% 
CPIF 4 0 4 0% 
FFP 510 14 524 2.67% 
Other 88 1 89 1.12% 
Total 693 22 715 3.08% 
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C. METHOD OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlation were used to analyze the data in this 
research. The statistical analysis required comparison of one variable to several other 
variables to determine relationships. A univariate approach was utilized for descriptive 
statistics analysis. For correlation analysis, pairwise deletion was used. Pairwise deletion 
is an effective statistical approach when random pieces of information are missing from a 
data set (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2013). To conduct pairwise correlation, a 
missing-data correlation matrix is created that allows sets of data with missing 
information to be omitted from analysis. A limitation of using this method is that it 
creates some “awkwardness” in the inference and confidence limits caused by varying 
observation sizes (Cohen et al., 2013, p 434). Pairwise correlation was used to analyze 
the relationship between award fee percent paid and contractor performance ratings. 
Further analysis of the data was conducted to determine the relationship between the 
acquisition life-cycle phase, the award fee criteria, and the weighted percent of each 
award fee criteria. The amount of award fee paid in comparison to the expected amount 
of award fee paid based on contractor performance ratings was also examined. The data 
analysis findings are further discussed in Chapter 4, Sections B and C. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the methodology used in the conduct of this research. The 
first section introduced Naegle’s three-phase approach and how it served as a foundation 
for the study. The second section described the development of the DSM by detailing the 
five major data groups of acquisition life-cycle, contract elements, award fee plan, earned 
value management, and contractor performance rating. The last section covered the 
statistical analyses used to understand the data. The next chapter provides the research 
findings, data analyses, study implications, and answers to the research questions. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the results of the research into the relationship between 
award fee decisions and contract success. The chapter begins with presentation of the 
basic research findings and points out limitations discovered during data collection, to 
include unavailability of EVM data. The chapter goes on to offer more in-depth analysis 
of the data. This section discusses actual award fee decisions in comparison to expected 
award fee decisions based on contractor performance ratings, analysis of award fee 
decisions to the acquisition life-cycle phase, and presents the relationship of contract 
success with contractor performance ratings using pairwise correlation. The third section 
discusses implications of the research findings. The last section provides answers to the 
research questions. 
B. DATA SUMMARY  
This section introduces the basic findings of the research. A sample of 13 
contracts was randomly chosen from a population of 31 award fee contracts from a major 
Navy command. Out of the 13 contracts chosen, seven contracts contained enough 
information to be considered a complete data set. All findings and analysis are based on 
the seven contracts that comprised a complete data set. The seven contracts were all 
multiyear contracts with periods of performance occurring between 2007 to 2014. All 
seven contracts had been closed out at the time of review. The average total contract 
value was $62 million, including base year cost and all option years. The average award 
fee pool was $5.2 million, with an average award fee decision percentage of 82% that 
equates to a $4.5 million award fee payment average. All of the contracts included 
statements prohibiting award fee pool rollover as recommended by GAO 06-66. The 
predominant contract type was CPAF with six observations. There was one CPFF 
contract that contained one award fee CLIN. Each of the seven contracts used trade off as 
the method to select the winning bidder for the contract. The FDO was the Program 
Executive Officer (PEO) on five contracts, with the Program Manager (PM) performing 
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FDO duties on two contracts. Two contracts were in the technology development (TD) 
acquisition life-cycle phase, with four contracts in engineering and manufacturing 
development (EMD), and one contract in the operations and support (O&S) phase. Five 
contracts were subcomponents of ACAT I programs, with one contract being a 
subcomponent of an ACAT II program. Table 4 below presents the award fee data just 
discussed.  












1 TD $6.7M $5.6M 83.22% 
2 TD $19.65M $16.6M 84.55% 
3 EMD $419K $365K 87.00% 
4 EMD $155K $123K 79.15% 
5 EMD $886K $714K 80.59% 
6 EMD $294K $208K 70.82% 
7 O&S $8.6M $7.8M 90.27% 
 
1. Limitation Discovered During Data Collection  
A significant limitation was discovered during data collection. EVM data was a 
proxy measure that the study intended to use as a predictor of contract success; however, 
relevant EVM data to the contract samples was not available. As previously mentioned 
five contracts were for subcomponents of an ACAT I program. The overarching ACAT I 
program had EVM data available, but it could not be verified or applied at the 
subcomponent level. The degree to which the subcomponent cost, schedule and 
performance measures contributed to the overarching ACAT I program cost, schedule 
and performance outcomes could not be determined, resulting in EVM being omitted 
from our analyses.  
2. Observations during Data Collection 
Several observations were discovered during data collection. There were three 
observations of consequence noted during data collection. The first observation was 
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differences in contract file structure; contract files did not follow a standardized format. 
Most contract files had documentation checklists; however, some did not. Some contract 
files contained request for proposal and pre-solicitation documentation, where other 
contract files excluded those documents, as they are not required to be retained.  
The second observation that related to contract file standardization is the absence 
of award fee decision documentation in the contract file. The researchers were expecting 
to find FDO decisions and related contract modification documents included in the 
physical contract files. They were found in one contract file, but were not available in the 
other twelve contract files selected. However, for six of those twelve contracts FDO 
decisions were located in the electronic contract database. Availability of FDO decisions 
or award fee decision contract modifications constrained the study to using seven data 
points instead of thirteen.   
The final observation pertained to contractor performance rating submissions. The 
researchers expected to find contractor performance ratings at the conclusion of each 
performance period, as well as a contract closeout performance rating submission. On 
several contracts, the researchers could not locate contractor performance rating 
submissions following each period of contract performance; however, every contract did 
have a contract closeout performance rating submission. For uniformity and cohesiveness 
of analysis, the contract closeout contractor performance ratings were used and the few 
period of performance contractor performance ratings were omitted. The next section 
provides further analysis of the research data.      
C. ANALYSIS 
This section presents analyses of the research data collected. The three analyses 
are: 1) evaluation of actual award fee payments and expected award fee payments 
compared to acquisition life-cycle phase, 2) examining award fee payments and 
contractor performance ratings to measure contract success, and 3) pairwise correlation to 
determine the relationship between award fee decisions and contract success.  
The first analysis compared actual award fee payments versus expected award fee 
payments. The actual award fee payment and expected award fee payment data points 
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were then plotted according to when they occurred in the acquisition life-cycle to 
determine the existence of any trends. Actual award fee payment amounts were provided 
in the contract files. To calculate expected award fee amounts, the weighting of each 
award fee plan criterion was multiplied by the contractor performance rating score for 
each category. The weighted scores were then summed. The sum of the weighted scores 
represents the expected award fee decision, if award fee decisions, award fee criteria 
weighting, and contractor performance ratings were perfectly aligned. For example, if a 
contractor received perfect contractor performance ratings of 5 (Excellent) in all 
categories, the expected award fee decision is 100%. The results of this analysis are 
shown below in Figure 2.1 All contract actual and expected award fee payments varied, 
with the closest match being a 1% difference (actual 79%, expected 80%). Although 
there was only one close match, the average difference between actual and expected 
award fee payments was 3%. No trend was discernable when comparing actual award fee 
payments and expected award fee payments to the acquisition life-cycle phase. More data 
is required to analyze award fee decision trends in relationship to the acquisition life-
cycle.   
 
 
Figure 2.  Award Fee Actual versus Expected Amount 
                                                 
1 The graph represents a snap shot of the seven contract observations in different phases of the 
acquisition life-cycle. The graph does not reflect single contract observations as they proceed along the 
acquisition life-cycle.  
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The second analysis technique examined award fee payments and contractor 
performance ratings to measure contract success. The Wilhite, Stover, and Hart contract 
success and failure model discussed in Chapter III, Section B.5 provided the basis to 
determine contract success and failure.2 Out of the seven contracts, only one score of 
marginal was observed. The score of marginal was entered in the contractor performance 
rating schedule category. This contract was awarded for a product in the EMD acquisition 
life-cycle phase. By receiving a contractor performance rating of marginal, this contract 
was deemed a failure per the Wilhite, Stover, and Hart model. The contract failure rate is 
14%, with one failure occurring in the sample of seven contracts. Wilhite, Stover, and 
Hart observed a failure rate of 5.17% for CPAF contracts. The higher failure rate in this 
study is likely the result of a smaller sample size with only seven contracts analyzed 
compared to 55 contracts in Wilhite, Stover, and Hart’s study. Mathematically, the 
smaller sample size will result in a higher failure rate with only one failed contract (1/7 = 
14%). The contract that included the marginal contract performance rating resulted in the 
lowest award fee decision at 71%, which is 11% less than the average award fee decision. 
Figure 3 reflects the award fee payment percentage, average contractor performance 
rating, and contract success or failure. The data is arranged from highest award fee 
percent paid to lowest percent paid from left to right.  
                                                 
2 Earned value management was omitted as a surrogate measure of contract success due to 
unavailability of relevant data. 
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Figure 3.  Award Fee and CPARS Rating to Measure Contract Success 
Figure 3 shows positive and negative overlaps between award fee payments and 
average contractor performance ratings. Figure 4 below highlights the over or under delta 
of this comparison. The combined result is an average award fee overpayment of 4%. To 
determine the average CPARS percentage, the average CPARS rating was divided by the 
maximum possible CPARS score of 5. Average CPARS percentage was then subtracted 
from the percentage of award fee paid to determine the delta. A positive delta indicates an 
overpayment, where a negative delta indicates an underpayment.   
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Figure 4.  Delta between Award Fee Paid and Average CPARS Rating 
The last data analysis method used pairwise correlation to determine the 
relationship between award fee decisions and contract success. Table 5 depicts the 
pairwise correlation results. Column (A), highlighted in yellow, shows the correlation 
relationships between earned award fee and the various CPARS evaluation factors. The 
results show a positive correlation between award fee decisions and contractor 
performance ratings. The only exception to positive correlation is program management 
with a score of -.295; all other correlations are positive. The production contractor 
performance rating had the strongest correlation with award fee decisions at .589. Cost 
control had the next highest correlation at .414. Although positive correlation can be 
shown, none of the findings are statistically significant.3 The lack of statistical 
significance is likely reflective of the small sample size. A larger sample of award fee 
contracts is needed to determine the true nature of these relationships. The next section 
discusses implications of the research findings and analysis.   
                                                 
3 Values marked with an asterisk in Table 5 had statistical significance, but were not further analyzed 
due to lack of standardization in the contract samples. Each contract had different weighting of the 
contractor performance categories.    
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Table 5.   Pairwise Correlation Table 
D. IMPLICATIONS 
This section discusses the implications of the research findings. The implications 
of this research are: 1) DOD’s responsiveness to GAO Report 06-66, 2) award fee 
alignment with contractor performance ratings, and 3) contract data capturing.  
1. DOD’s Response to GAO Report 06-66   
This research indicates that DOD sufficiently responded to GAO Report 06-66 
recommendations. GAO recommended eliminating the usage of award fee rollover. In all 
31 contracts observed, every contract contained verbiage prohibiting the use of award fee 
rollover. Under this change, contractors will have one opportunity period to earn the 
available award fee pool. In report 06-66, GAO suggested DOD was liberally 
determining award fee decision amounts. GAO observed an average award fee payment 
percentage of 90%, with several large-scale programs receiving 100% award fee 





















# observations 7 12
Production 0.589 0.538 1.000
# observations 6 9 9
Schedule 0.384 0.904* 0.667 1.000
# observations 7 11 8 11
Cost Control 0.414 0.692* 0.811* 0.700* 1.000
# observations 7 12 9 11 12
Program 
Management -0.295 0.692* 0.229 0.735* 0.294 1.000
# observations 7 12 9 11 12 12
* Statistically Significant (p < .05)
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observations of 100% award fee decisions. Likewise, the poorest performing contractor 
per contractor performance rating received the lowest award fee payment percentage at 
70.82%. 
2. Award Fee Alignment 
Although the findings were not statistically significant, the researchers believe 
award fee decisions were aligned with contractor performance ratings. Firstly, there was a 
positive correlation between award fee decisions and contractor performance ratings. 
Using the Wilhite, Stover, and Hart contract success and failure model, six out of seven 
award fee contracts were shown to be successful. Additionally, two comparative 
measures showed actual and expected award fee payments were 3% different on average 
and average award fee overpayment was only 4%. 
3. Contract Data Capturing 
Contracting research is complicated by a lack of standardized, sufficient data. 
Multiple hard copy files, electronic files, and contract databases are utilized during the 
contracting process. Through the conduct of this research it was noted that the contents of 
those files are not standardized. This makes collecting contracting data for the purposes 
of comparative analysis problematic. Critical programmatic measures, such as EVM data 
is not readily available for all decision makers. In some instances contractor performance 
ratings did not align with the contractor performance rating narratives. For instance, a 
contractor received low performance ratings, but the narrative only contained praise. 
These issues raise questions regarding the utility of the current manual and electronic 
contract files.   
The next section provides answers to the research questions that guided this study. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTION ANSWERS 
This section provides answers to the three research questions aimed at 
determining the relationship between award fee decisions and contract success.  
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1. How are Award Fee Decisions and EVM Related? 
This question was unable to be answered due to lack of availability of applicable 
EVM data. As discussed in the findings section of this Chapter, EVM data was only 
available for five contracts at the overarching program level. The researchers could not 
directly link the subcomponent contracts that they reviewed to the EVM data available. 
For this reason, EVM data was omitted from the study and this research question remains 
unanswered.    
2. How are Award Fee Decisions and Contractor Performance Related?  
This question can be best answered using pairwise correlation data provided in 
Table 5 in Section C of this Chapter. As the pairwise correlations indicate, there is a 
positive correlation between award fee decisions and contractor performance ratings. 
None of the relationships are statistically significant; however, that is likely the result of a 
small sample size. The limited data suggests that award fee payments are aligned with 
contractor performance ratings. There was only one contract failure identified in the 
sample using the Wilhite, Stover, and Hart contract failure and success model. That 
contract received the lowest award fee payment percentage of 71%, which is 11% less 
than the average award fee payment percent. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter IV, 
section C, the average difference between actual and expected award fee payments was 
only 3%.  
Contracts that received a contractor performance rating average above 4.0 
displayed greater volatility in the award fee payment percentage. As shown in Figure 3, 
the contracts that received the highest award fee payments had an average contractor 
performance rating of 3.67, resulting in an average overpayment of 10.67%. Further 
research is needed to determine the cause of this variability. 
3. How are Successful Contracts, as Identified by EVM and Contractor 
Performance Ratings, Related to Other Contract Elements? 
Six out of seven contracts were deemed successful according to contractor 
performance ratings. Of those contracts, several contract elements were consistent. In 
particular, each successful contract was multiyear, used a tradeoff source selection 
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strategy, was predominantly a CPAF contract, and had an average total dollar value of 
$70.67 million. It could be argued that these results suggest that award fee contracts can 
be used in multiple scenarios, throughout the acquisition life-cycle with success. The 
large total contract dollar value indicates award fees can successfully support major 
procurement programs. Award fees increase administration costs due to the need for 
increased performance monitoring and requirements associated with the award fee 
decision process. The association of award fees and large total dollar value contracts 
highlights the government’s desire to improve contracting performance outcomes by 
utilizing contractor incentives. The added cost of utilizing award fees appears to be 
beneficial on such large-scale projects.    
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter provides the results of the study into the relationship between award 
fee decisions and contract success. The chapter began by covering the basic findings of 
the research. It went on discuss further analysis of the data by using three different data 
comparison techniques. The next section highlighted the implications of this research as 
it relates to the DOD. The last section provided answers to the three research questions. 
The next chapter summarizes the study, submits final conclusions, and offers areas for 
further research.     
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
The DOD spends roughly half of its annual budget on contracts or purchase 
orders, highlighting the importance of motivating contractor performance (GAO, 2014). 
Incentive contracts, such as award fee contracts, are key mechanisms contracting officers 
and program managers can use to incentivize contractors to achieve desired outcomes in 
areas such as cost, schedule, and performance. Incentive contracts have been used by the 
DOD as early as the beginning of the 20th century with the Army’s requisition of the 
Wright Flyer (Snyder, 2001). The use of award fee contracts became more prevalent in 
the 1960s and grew from the 1970s until 2006 with the release of GAO 06-66.  
Award fee contract usage dropped by 46% in 2007 and 85% in 2008 in response 
GAO’s report (Rutherford, 2009). Research in response to GAO’s report focused on the 
problems with award fees, including misalignment of incentives with desired outcomes, 
inadequate workforce training, lack of standard operating procedures, and poor guidance 
(Hearns & Mitchell, 2007; Ricks, et al., 2013; Tremaine, 2008).  Tremaine’s research, 
geared at identifying “correlations between incentive-type contracts and performance 
outcomes,” prompted our research questions, hence we posited that EVM and CPARS 
data may be used as surrogate indicators of contract success or failure, which could then 
be examined in relation to award fee decisions (Tremaine, 2008, p. 217).  
B. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research was to determine if a relationship exists between 
award fee decisions and contract success or failure as measured by earned value 
management (EVM) or contractor performance ratings. To determine if a relationship 
existed, we attempted to answer the following questions. 
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1. How are Award Fee Decisions and EVM Related?
This question was not answered due to the unavailability of suitable data to 
determine any relationship. The EVM data collected was for MDAP level reporting and 
could not be parsed out for the smaller contract actions related to the program. Due to the 
inability to directly link the EVM data to the contract action, this research question could 
not be answered. 
2. How are Award Fee Decisions and Contractor Performance Related?
We found a positive correlation between award fee decisions and contractor 
performance ratings. The strength of this finding is not statistically significant, likely due 
to a small sample size. Contract actions with a rating of exceptional in CPARS tended to 
correlate with a commensurate amount of award fee payment. Similarly, the contract 
action with a rating of satisfactory in CPARS received a commensurate amount of award 
fee decision paid. This indicates that, for the contract actions we observed, DOD is 
paying award fees that are in line with the level of performance achieved.    
3. How are Successful Contracts, as Identified by EVM and Contractor
Performance Ratings, Related to Other Contract Elements?
Each of the six successful contracts observed had several similar contract 
elements: multiyear contracts, tradeoff source selection strategies, CPAF contract types, 
and an average total dollar value of $70.67 million. Similar to our second research 
question, this finding is more descriptive in nature due to the small sample size. No clear 
inferences could be made of the relationship of successful contracts by life-cycle phase. 
The only unsuccessful contract observed occurred during the EMD phase. For this 
contract, the award fee decision matched the CPARS ratings.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
We recommend the following actions for further research: increase the size of the 
data pool within the Navy and other DOD services and agencies, conduct a comparative 
analysis of the pre- and post-DOD policy changes in response to the GAO 06-66 report, 
conduct further analysis of contract elements, and determine the plausibility of using 
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EVM as a surrogate measure for contract success on MDAPs. The next few sections 
provide more details of each of these recommendations. 
1. Increase the Size of the Data Pool
The strength of this research would be enhanced with the inclusion of other Navy 
SYSCOMs. The expansion of the data pool to include multiple SYSCOMs would allow 
for a larger sample size, varied standard operating procedures (SOPs) from each 
SYSYCOM, and a more comprehensive assessment of the use of award fees across the 
Navy. The larger sample size would increase the statistical rigor, allow for more complex 
analysis (such as regression), and enable a more granular assessment of the relationship 
of award fee decisions to contract success using CPARS and EVM as surrogate measures. 
The inclusion of other DOD services or agencies, such as the U.S. Army, U.S. 
Air Force, or other agencies such as the Missile Defense Agency, would allow for a 
more comprehensive assessment of the relationship of award fee decisions and contract 
success as measured by CPARS and EVM across the entire DOD. The inclusion of 
these other services or agencies would allow for a much larger sample size, increase 
statistical rigor, allow for more complex analysis (such as regression), and enable 
a more granular assessment of the relationship of award fee decisions to contract 
success using CPARS and EVM as surrogate measures. The resultant findings would 
be more representative of the DOD and potentially allow for the identification of 
trends, best practices, and shared lessons learned.  
2. Conduct a Comparative Analysis of the Pre- and Post-DOD Policy
Changes in Response to the GAO 06-66 Report
Emulating the research methodology used in this research on data for award fee 
decisions prior to the DOD response to GAO 06-66 would enable a comparison of the 
relationship of award fee decisions and contract success using CPARS and EVM as 
surrogate measures. This approach may require the development of another surrogate 
measure of success for data captured prior to the implementation of mandatory CPARS 
reporting. The examination of the data for award fee decisions prior to GAO 06-66, or 
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perhaps in the same timeframe as the period reviewed by GAO, may help determine if the 
GAO report focused too heavily on newsworthy failures to derive their findings.  
3. Further Analysis of Contract Elements  
Further research on the relationship of award fee decisions and contract success 
using CPARS and EVM as surrogate measures with a focus on the analysis of the 
relationship by contract element would allow for the identification of variables that may 
influence contract success or a positive relationship correlation. A larger sample size 
tailored towards the inclusion of representative sample sizes by contract element would 
allow for the identification of the contract elements’ impact on the relationship of award 
fee decisions to contract success using CPARS and EVM as surrogate measures. 
4. Determining the Plausibility of Using EVM as a Surrogate Measure 
for Contract Success on MDAPs  
Further research structured around only MDAP contracts would allow the 
determination of the efficacy of using EVM as a surrogate measure for contract success. 
Close coordination with PEOs may facilitate the access to requisite data to test the 
Sherman Lipscomb EVM Performance Matrix (SLEPM). Additionally, further research 
could be to determine the most effective method for using EVM as a surrogate measure 
for contract success. This research requires a comprehensive case study approach for the 
assessment of MDAPs’ use of award fees within their programs and comparison with 
EVM reporting by award fee periods of performance. This level of detail is not available 
in the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) system and 
would require close coordination with the PEO and access to granular EVM data. The 
results of this research may lead to the development of a new use for EVM as not only a 
risk management and reporting tool, but also a contract management tool. 
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Multiyear Period Start Period End Dollar Value











1 336611 1903 Cost Plus Award Fee No Yes 12/7/07 12/5/12 $62,430,600 Trade Off ID FAR 15 Production & Deployment No 69 PM Schedule
2 336611 1924 Cost Plus Award Fee Yes Yes 3/11/09 3/12/14 $288,159,874 Trade Off FAR 15 Operations & Support No 18 PM Management
3 336611 J998 Cost Plus Award Fee Yes Yes 10/22/09 10/22/14 $91,585,410 Trade Off FAR 15 Operations & Support No 38 PM Management
4 336611 J998 Cost Plus Incentive Fee Yes Yes 7/12/10 7/12/15 $75,715,304 Trade Off FAR 15 Production & Deployment No 30 PM Management
6 336611 J019 Cost Plus Award Fee Yes Yes 1/14/10 1/13/15 $65,840,435 Trade Off FAR 15 Operations & Support No 59 PM Management
7 336611 J999 Cost Plus Award Fee No Yes 8/25/08 8/24/14 $98,849,071 Trade Off FAR 15 Operations & Support No 18 PM Management
8 541712 5841 Cost Plus Award Fee No Yes 12/12/07 9/18/09 $8,516,463 Trade Off IAC FAR 15 Engineering & Manufacturi  No 14 PEO Management
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